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PHYSICIAN TERMINATIONS IN
MANAGED CARE: WHY ARE THEY
OCCURRING? HOW DO WE ENSURE
THEY ARE JUST?
Aynah V. Askanas, J.D.*
I. INTRODUCTION
THIS ARTICLE DISCUSSES THE PROBLEMS faced by
the physician and patient (also referred to in this Article as the
"enrollee") when a physician is terminated from a managed care
plan. The Article also explains why physicians should be termi-
nated only for reasons which constitute justifiable cause, and ex-
amines the laws developed in California to discourage unjust
terminations.
II. NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF PHYSICIAN TERMINATION
Physicians currently are being terminated from managed
care plans for various reasons, many of which are discussed
herein. Managed care plans have coined the term "de-selection"
to describe the process of terminating physicians from managed
care plans. This term is a euphemism. Termination of the physi-
cian from a managed care plan often causes serious hardship for
the physician's patients who are, in most cases, unable to con-
tinue to see their physician. This can be devastating for patients,
especially those with long-term illnesses who are accustomed to
confiding in and trusting one physician. Long-term physician-
patient relationships should not be interrupted unless good cause
exists. Meaningful patient choice of a physician and a continuous
physician-patient relationship is essential for enrollee satisfaction
with a managed care plan. Moreover, termination from a plan
often has a severe financial impact on the physician. Physicians
* Legal Counsel, California Medical Association. The author thanks Astrid G.
Meghrigian, Esquire, for her assistance with the antitrust analysis contained in this Article.
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could lose fifty percent (or more) of their patient bases when
they are terminated from a plan.
I. THE PLAN SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO GIVE THE
REASON FOR TERMINATION
Because of these extreme negative effects on both the pa-
tient and the physician, plans should be required, either by con-
tract or pursuant to law, to give physicians the reason for their
termination. Unfortunately, however, most physician participation
contracts state that the physician may be terminated without
cause, that is, for any reason or no reason, upon a prior written
notice. A California law requires health maintenance organiza-
tions (HMOs) and other health plans licensed under California's
Knox-Keene Act to give physicians the reason for termination
whenever: i) the termination is for quality reasons; or, ii) the ter-
mination occurs during, as opposed to at the expiration of, the
contract year.'
Providing a reason for termination is important as it gives
the physician terminated for quality reasons the option to pursue
hearing rights afforded under state and/or federal law.2 Providing
the reason for termination also ensures that physicians have an
opportunity to inform the plan of any mistake regarding the rea-
son given. Moreover, if the reason for the termination involves
patient relations, such as bedside manner or waiting times for ap-
pointments, disclosure of such information will enable physicians
to improve their patient relation skills.
IV. POTENTIALLY APPROPRIATE REASONS FOR
PHYSICIAN TERMINATION
The following discussion describes several reasons that may
constitute good cause for physician termination where the termi-
nation is conducted appropriately.
1. CAL. HEALTH & SAFmET CODE § 1373.65 (West Supp. 1996). In California, the law
governing HMOs (and some Blue Shield plans) is called the "Knox-Keene Act." Plans gov-
erned by the law are called Knox-Keene plans, most of which are HMOs. Id. § 1340.
2. See infra I.A.l.
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A. Termination For Quality Reasons
As a general matter, if a physician is terminated because his
or her care or competence remains substandard after educational
intervention and an opportunity to improve skills, the physician's
termination is best for all parties involved. Patients should not be
subject to incompetent physicians, and incompetent physicians
should not be permitted to practice. Termination for quality rea-
sons triggers the filing of a report with the state licensing board
and the National Practitioners Data Bank. This ensures that the
physician's license to practice is affected appropriately by the
reason for termination.
1. Hearing Rights
A physician may be terminated purportedly for quality rea-
sons, however, in order to mask the true reason for termination.
The termination may be political or it may be for anticompetitive
reasons.3 Therefore, when a physician is terminated purportedly
for quality reasons, state law should require that a hearing be af-
forded the physician.4  A hearing is necessary to determine
3. See, e.g., Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 843 F.2d 139, 144-45 (3rd Cir. 1988) (finding suf-
ficient evidence to preclude summary judgment on the question of whether termination was
for anticompetitive or quality reasons). See also Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988). In
Burget, an Oregon surgeon declined an invitation to join a clinic, and instead became a com-
petitor. The peer review committee, comprised in part of the competing physicians, recom-
mended termination from the hospital medical staff on the grounds that the physician's care
was substandard.
4. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 809.1-809.9 (West 1990 & Supp. 1996).
Under the Code, the entities must afford the physician, as well as other practitioners, a hear-
ing if the physician is terminated for medical quality reasons. A hearing must be afforded
even if the physician's contract says that a termination is final and the physician has no hear-
ing rights:
(A) A medical or professional staff of any health care facility or clinic ... or of a
facility certified to participate in the federal Medicare program as an ambulatory sur-
gical center.
(B) A health care service plan registered under [the Knox-Keene Act] ....
(C) Any medical, psychological, dental, or podiatric professional society having as
members at least 25 percent of the eligible licentiates in the area in which it func-
tions (which must include at least one county), which is not organized for profit and
which has been determined to be exempt from taxes pursuant to Section 23701 of
the Revenue and Taxation Code.
(D) A committee organized by any entity [e.g., an IPA] consisting of or employing
more than 25 licentiates of the same class which functions for the purpose of re-
viewing the quality of professional care provided by members or employees of that
entity.
Id. § 805(a)(1)(A)-(D). The code also specifies many protections for the accused physician to
ensure that due process is afforded. Id. §§ 809.1-809.9.
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whether a true quality issue exists, whether termination, which is
an egregious remedy, is warranted, or whether physician educa-
tion would remedy the problem.
If a hearing is not required under state law, or if the physi-
cian is contracting with a plan outside of the physician's state,
the plan may provide for a hearing when the physician is termi-
nated for quality of care reasons in compliance with the federal
Health Care Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA).5 The HCQIA
does not mandate that plans comply with its notice and hearing
provisions; rather, it provides immunity protections for those that
do. The HCQIA generally immunizes from liability peer review
action under state and most federal laws (including the antitrust
laws) if the action is taken:
a. in the reasonable belief that the action taken promotes qual-
ity health care;
b. after a reasonable effort to obtain the facts;
c. in the reasonable belief that the action is warranted by the
facts known; and,
d. after the physician involved receives adequate notice and a
fair hearing.6
With respect to the fourth element of the immunity-the notice
and hearing requirements-the Act establishes a "safe harbor"
to guarantee that the notice and hearing will be found to be
"fair" if certain stated procedures are followed.
B. Termination as a Result of Poor Utilization Profile After
Educational Intervention
Managed care organizations increasingly are developing util-
ization profiles of physicians. Such profiles, or report cards as
they are sometimes called, are used to tell physicians whether
their utilization of services is appropriate, that is, whether they
could provide lesser care or less expensive care while (hopefully)
maintaining quality. These profiles may be used for everything
from purely educational exercises, to calculating payment, to
making termination decisions. Regardless of the use to which the
profile will be put, utilization cannot be analyzed in a vacuum.
In order for utilization reports to be accurate, to enable a physi-
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (1994) (providing standards for professional review ac-
tions and the reporting of such information to promote review activity).
6. Id. § 11112 (listing the general standards for professional review actions).
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cian to educate herself, and, to provide a fair basis for termina-
tion decisions, the report should take into account at least the
following points.
1. The Severity of Illness
Adjustments need to be made for the differences in severity
of illness of the physician's patients, especially in the case of
physicians who see relatively fewer patients and for whom cata-
strophic cases will have a greater chance of producing a negative
utilization report. Severity of illness is a term used to describe
the relative health of the physician's patient population. Physi-
cians who see sicker patients should not receive a bad profile or
report card when their high utilization is due primarily to that
fact. Rather, such profiles should take into account the relative
health of the physician's patients. Catastrophic cases should be
eliminated from the physician's utilization analysis in determin-
ing the cost-effectiveness of the physician on a usual, day-to-day
basis.
A recent study appearing in the Journal of the American
Medical Association concludes that "nonwhite physicians are
more likely to care for minority, medically indigent and sicker
patients." '7
With respect to physician profiling, the author states,
Physician profiling requires adjustment for severity of illness
to distinguish poor patient outcomes attributable to more se-
vere illness from poor patient outcome attributable to poor-
quality medical care. Because nonwhite physicians care for
sicker patients, they are particularly dependent on accurate ad-
justment for severity of illness. Failure to adjust adequately
could deny nonwhite physicians just reimbursement or errone-
ously attribute poor patient outcomes to poor care.8
Plans would do well to be aware of this study, adjust their statis-
tics properly, and take care not to penalize minority and other
physicians for treating a sicker population.
7. Ernest Moy & Barbara A. Bartman, Physician Race and Care of Minority and Medi-
cally Indigent Patients, 273 JAMA 1515, 1517 (1995).
8. Id. at 1518.
Winter 1996]
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2. Physician Specialty and Diagnostic Mix: Patient Demo-
graphics
Specialists and primary care physicians (PCPs) should be
evaluated separately. Generally, a patient who is referred to a
specialist has a more advanced or complicated condition, and
consequently, care is more costly. This problem is particularly
acute for subspecialists. Likewise, adjustments should be made
for each physician's diagnostic mix. This allows one to compare,
for example, gynecologists who do not deliver babies with those
who provide the full range of obstetrical and gynecological
services.
The plan likewise should account for the demographic mix
of patients. If a physician with an older patient mix is compared
with a physician who has a younger patient mix, the former will
appear less cost-effective if adjustments are not made for the
demographic mix.
3. Profiling Systems and Procedures
Plans should use sophisticated software capable of making
necessary adjustments to data and taking into account the points
mentioned above. Moreover, regular assessments should be made
of the quality of care provided by the physicians being profiled.
Plans should use educational intervention before termination is
considered, to teach physicians to use services which are of
equal or better quality. These may include efforts to improve
physician awareness of the costs and clinical indications of tests,
procedures, and treatments, and to provide feedback to the physi-
cians regarding their expenditures for patient care and the
clinical appropriateness of their practices. Educational interven-
tion often is effective in reducing the utilization of services. A
physician participation contract never should be terminated for
high utilization unless such utilization was inappropriate, the
physician has been informed of the problem, and has been given
sufficient time to correct the behavior.
4. Termination For Business Reasons
Managed care plans (like all businesses) should be permitted
to terminate physicians for legitimate business reasons, for exam-
ple, because the plan has too many physicians in a particular
specialty or because a plan is appropriately "downsizing." How-
[Vol. 6:167
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ever, business reasons should not be used as a ruse for inappro-
priate termination. For example, some plans hire large numbers
of physicians before the open enrollment period9 so that their
physician lists look expansive and contain many of the employ-
ees' preferred physicians. After open enrollment, some plans ter-
minate many of the recently hired physicians, purportedly for
business reasons. The doctors, however, were hired only to make
the plan roster look comprehensive. This type of fraudulent ac-
tivity should be prohibited and, indeed, is prohibited under some
states' HMO laws.'0 Too, plans should not be allowed to "down-
size" their panels to the extent that there is not adequate, geo-
graphically accessible access to physicians.
V. INAPPROPRIATE REASONS FOR PHYSICIAN
TERMINATION
Managed care plans terminate physicians for other reasons
which are inappropriate and should not be tolerated under the
law.
A. Retaliation By Managed Care Plans
Most managed care contracts state that the plan may termi-
nate~the physician "without cause"; that is, for any reason or no
reason at all. Plans have terminated physicians under this no
cause termination provision because a physician protested a utili-
zation review (U.R.) decision that the physician felt was adverse
to patient care. 1 Termination also has occurred where physicians
have otherwise communicated with the plan regarding U.R. pro-
cedures that could adversely affect the quality of care. In one
case, a patient needed a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan,
but it was denied by the U.R. committee. The physician was ad-
amant that the MRI was medically necessary. He vociferously
appealed to the committee to authorize the MRI. The committee
again refused to authorize the scan. The physician repeatedly ap-
9. "Open enrollment" is the window period during which employees may change from
one health care plan to another.
10. CAL. HEAH & SAFM CODE § 1360(a)(1) (West 1990) (providing that "[a] writ-
ten or printed statement or item of information shall be deemed untrue if it does not conform
to fact in any respect which is, or may be significant to an enrollee ... or potential
enrollee ....").
11. "Utilization review" is the term applied to a plan's oversight of a practitioner's
services to determine whether the services are too costly and/or unnecessary.
Winter 1996]
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pealed the U.R. committee's decision, and the MRI scan finally
was approved. The physician, however, was terminated from the
plan two weeks later.'2
Another case involved a physician who requested a meeting
with a plan's U.R. committee to discuss the plan's second-opin-
ion program, an aspect of a U.R. program that requires patients
to seek second opinions when costly treatment is prescribed by a
physician. This physician felt that the program sometimes re-
quired his patients to travel great distances in order to obtain the
second opinion, and that in many cases, such travel resulted in
great hardship to the already ill patient. The U.R. committee lis-
tened to the physician's criticism of the program, then terminated
the physician from the plan.' 3
Because of cases such as these, the California Medical As-
sociation sponsored legislation in California to address these
problems. The law became effective in 1994. Under this law,
plans (and other entities) are prohibited from terminating or oth-
erwise retaliating against a physician for appealing denials of
care or communicating with the plan in order to improve patient
care. 4 The law states that it is the public policy of the State of
California that a physician be encouraged to advocate for medi-
cally appropriate health care for his or her patients. "To advocate
for medically appropriate health care" under the statute means to
appeal a payor's decision to deny payment for a service pursuant
to the plan's grievance or appeal procedure, or to protest a deci-
sion or policy that the physician reasonably believes impairs the
physician's ability to provide medically appropriate care to his or
her patients. 5 Moreover, the law provides that a decision to ter-
minate an employment or other contractual relationship, or other-
wise to penalize a physician for advocating for medically appro-
priate health care, violates the public policy of California.' 6 The
new law, however, does not prohibit a payor from making a de-
termination not to pay for a particular medical treatment or ser-
12. These facts were reported by the physician in requesting assistance from the medi-
cal association.
13. These two examples, among others, prompted the California Medical Association's
sponsorship of corrective legislation.
14. CAL- BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2056 (West Supp. 1996) (stating that the law applies to
medical groups, individual practice association (IPAs), preferred provider organization (PPOs),
foundations, hospital medical staffs and governing bodies, and payers).
15. Id. § 2056(b).
16. Id. § 2056(c).
[Vol. 6:167
PHYSICIAN TERMINATIONS
vice, nor does it prohibit a managed care plan or hospital medi-
cal staff from conducting necessary peer or utilization review. 17
It is important that managed care plans be prohibited from
terminating physicians who appeal decisions which adversely af-
fect patient care, because both the physician and the plan may be
held liable when a patient suffers harm as a result of a bad U.R.
decision.18 The Wickline and Wilson cases require physicians to
protest or appeal adverse U.R. decisions on behalf of their pa-
tients. This is done by exhausting the plan's appeal procedures,
or, if none exist, by communicating with the plan to persuade the
plan to change its decision.
B. Lack of Board Certification
Many employers require that their contracting HMOs be ac-
credited by the National Committee for Quality Assurance
(NCQA). NCQA Standards require that plans consider board cer-
tification 19 as part of the credentialing and recredentialing stan-
dards.20 Moreover, NCQA devises report cards for each HMO
using what is known as the Healthplan Employer Data Informa-
tion Set (HEDIS). One element of the HEDIS criteria is the per-
centage of board-certified physicians in the plan. Plans with
higher percentages are seen (however accurately) as being of
higher quality. Therefore, managed care plans now are excluding
and terminating nonboard-certified physicians. No studies, how-
ever, have demonstrated that board-certified physicians provide
higher quality care than nonboard-certified physicians.
The lack of board certification standing alone should not be
a reason for exclusion from a plan. In a 1994 Report,21 the U.S.
General Accounting Office stated that: "One measure of quality
used by many health plans and included in report cards is the
17. Id. § 2056(d).
18. See Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a third
party payor may be held liable for medically inappropriate decisions). See also Wilson v.
Blue Cross, 271 Cal. Rptr. 876, 883 (CL App. 1990) (finding sufficient evidence to raise tria-
ble issue of fact as to whether U.R. decision to terminate benefits contributed to patient's
death).
19. Physicians who complete an extensive residency program and pass an intensive
exam in a particular specialty area are said to be "board certified" in that specialty.
20. See NATIONAL COMMrTTEE FOR QuALrry AssuRANcE, REvIEwER GUIDELINES: STAN-
DARDS FOR ACCREDIrrATION, CR 5.4, CR 10.2.4 (1995).
21. U.S. GEN. Accr. OFIFic, HEALTH CARE REFORM: "REPORT CARDS" ARE USEFUL BUT
SINuzicANT IssuEs NEED TO BE ADDRSED. GAOiHEHS-94-219 (1994) (asserting that some
measures of purported quality used by many health plans are misleading).
Winter 1996]
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number of board-certified physicians on staff. Presumably, the
more board-certified physicians a plan has on its staff, the better
the health care will be. But research has not shown conclusively
that board-certified physicians furnish better care.'"2 The report,
in discussing the validity of quality measures, went on to say:
"No one has proven that the patients of board-certified physi-
cians have better results than other patients. In fact, in five of
seven studies reviewed by the Office of Technology Assessment
(OTA), physician board certification showed no effect on per-
formance. '2 3 Moreover, the report questioned the relevancy of
board certification as a predictor of clinical ability. "Addition-
ally, the certification process may be invalid-written and oral
tests used to evaluate physician performance may not measure
success in clinical practice." '24
Because it does not appear that termination or exclusion for
lack of board certification enhances the quality of patient care,
patients, physicians, and their lawyers may wish to work toward
eliminating the NCQA standards and the HEDIS criteria that im-
ply that board certification should be required.
C. Failure of the Physician to Join Other Plan Products
Some physicians are terminated because they do not want to
participate in, or have terminated relationships with, other plan
products. For example, a physician may be terminated from a
plan's PPO product because the physician will not join, or has
terminated a contract with, a plan's HMO product. Such termina-
tions are not for good cause, but are an effort by plans to main-
tain market power in the unwanted product. Terminations for
such reasons may be a violation of federal and state laws.
D. State Law Violation
A plan's retaliation against physicians for terminating other
plan contracts may violate the Knox-Keene Act (a California
HMO law) which requires that all physician contracts be fair and
reasonable.25 An implicit term in the contractual arrangement be-
tween the physician and the plan is that if a physician terminates
22. Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 39 (emphasis added).
24. Id.
25. CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367(h) (West 1990 & Supp. 1996).
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her contract with one product, the plan will terminate the physi-
cian's contract with another product. Certainly, this anticompeti-
tive term is not fair and reasonable, particularly given the addi-
tional problems discussed below.
E. Illegal Tying Arrangement
Both federal and state laws generally outlaw any combina-
tion or agreement which restrains trade or competition.26 One
form of an unlawful agreement is a tying arrangement, which the
Supreme Court described as the seller's exploitation of its control
over one product to force the buyer into the purchase of another
product "that the buyer either did not want at all, or might have
preferred to purchase elsewhere on different terms. When such
'forcing' is present, competition on the merits in the market for
the tied product is restrained and the Sherman Act is violated." 27
Tying arrangements have no procompetitive purpose, and, ac-
cordingly, are not tolerated by the courts. Courts have recognized
that:
[T]ying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the sup-
pression of competition (citation omitted). They deny competi-
tors free access to the market for the tied product, not because
the party imposing the tying requirements has a better product
or a lower price but because of his power or leverage in an-
other market . . . .For these reasons "tying agreements fare
harshly under the laws forbidding restraints of trade." 2s
A plan's termination of a physician from one product be-
cause the physician rejects a different plan product presents a
classic mirror image of the typical tying arrangement. By condi-
tioning the ability of physicians to participate in one product on
participation in another, plans are, in effect, coercing sellers of
health care services, that is, physicians, to participate in the tied
product. The net result is that plans are "insulate[d] . .. from
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). See also CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16720, 16722, 16726
(West 1990).
27. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984). The alleged ty-
ing arrangement in Jefferson Parish was an exclusive contract between a hospital and a group
of anesthesiologists requiring all anesthesiology services at the hospital to be performed by
the group. If a patient wanted to use the hospital and needed anesthesia services, the patient
had to use the group for those services. The court held there was no illegal tying because
there was no showing that the hospital had the power to force patients to use the tied product
(the anesthesia group) because it had no forcing power (leverage) in the tying product (hospi-
tal services). Id. at 28-29.
28. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958).
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the competitive stresses of the open market."' 29 Physicians are
not choosing to participate in certain products because it is a bet-
ter product, but rather because they must do so in order to par-
ticipate in the desired product. This is precisely the type of activ-
ity that the antitrust laws are designed to prevent. "[T]he use of
power over one product to attain power over another, or other-
wise to distort freedom of trade and competition in the second
product," is prohibited.30
F. Violations of the Anti-Kickback Statute
By requiring physicians to participate in an undesired prod-
uct in order to participate in a desired program, a plan is, in ef-
fect, requiring physicians to pay for patient referrals: participa-
tion in the unwanted product is "payment for" being permitted
to participate in the desired product and for receiving the referral
of patients through the desired product. This may be unlawful
because federal and some state laws prohibit paying or receiving
compensation for referral of patients. Federal Medicare and
Medicaid law prohibits "fee-splitting." Federal law provides in
pertinent part:
(1) Whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any
remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly
or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind -
(A) in return for referring an individual to a person for
the furnishing or arranging for the furnishing of any item or
service for which payment may be made in whole or in part
under subchapter XVIII of this chapter [Medicare] or a State
health care program, or
(B) in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arrang-
ing for or recommending purchasing, leasing, or ordering any
good, facility, service, or item for which payment may be
made in whole or in part under subchapter XVIII of this chap-
ter or a State health care program, shall be guilty of a felony
and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than
$25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.3
29. Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953).
30. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 13 n.19 (quoting Fortner Enterprises v. United States
Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 512-14 (1969) (White, J., dissenting)).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1) (1994). See also United States v. Bay State Ambulance
& Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc., 847 F.2d 20 (lst Cir. 1989) (affirming conviction of defendants
for arranging illegal referrals); United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68 (3rd Cir. 1985), cert. de-
nied, 474 U.S. 988 (1985) (finding a violation of the Medicare statute when even just one
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By engaging in such activity, plans are "knowingly," albeit,
"indirectly," soliciting a rebate (physician participation in an un-
desirable plan) in return for referring patients to the physician
through the desired product. The prohibitions established by sec-
tion 1320a-7b(b) apply to both the Medicare and Medicaid
programs.
G. California Business & Professions Code Section 650
The offense defined in California Business & Professions
Code section 650 contains five elements:
(1) An offer, delivery, receipt, or acceptance
(2) by physicians or other licensed health care providers, of
(3) "consideration" (anything of value) to or from any person,
(4) as compensation or inducement
(5) for the referral of patients. 32
At least one California appellate court has reviewed the
practice of compensating for referrals and found that it violated
Business & Professions Code section 650. 33 The court said it
would look through any subtle effort to circumvent section 650
by disguising the referral scheme involved.3 4 A plan's tying par-
ticipation in one plan to participation in another is one such sub-
tle effort. Third-party payors have strong financial incentives to
shift patients into their HMO lines, and the potential for abuse is
real. By offering physicians an HMO contract as a condition of
referring patients under the PPO contract, plans are, in fact, en-
gaging in the very activity that the anti-fee splitting laws were
designed to address.
H. Unfair Business Practice
Similarly, the termination of one contract due to a physi-
cian's failure to contract with another product is likely to be pro-
hibited as an unfair business practice under state law. The Cali-
fornia Business & Professions Code provides: "[als used in this
chapter, unfair competition shall mean and include any unlawful,
purpose of the payment made to a physician was to induce future referrals); United States v.
Kats, 871 R2d 105 (9th Cir. 1989) (reiterating the Greber "one purpose" test).
32. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 650 (West 1990 & Supp. 1996).
33. Mason v. Hosta, 199 Cal. Rptr. 859 (CL App. 1984) (affirming summary judgment
of dismissal based on contract illegality).
34. ld., at 863.
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unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, decep-
tive, untrue or misleading advertising and any act prohibited by
Chapter 1 (commencing with section 17500) of Part 3 of Divi-
sion 7 of the Business & Professions Code."35
Not only is such plan activity unlawful, for the reasons set
forth above, but it is also unfair. The determination of whether a
practice is unfair "involves an examination of [the practice's]
impact on its alleged victim, balanced against the reasons, justifi-
cations and motives of the alleged wrongdoer. '36 Accordingly, a
court must "weigh the utility of the defendant's conduct against
the gravity of the harm to the alleged victim . . . . ",37 Further,
practices may be "unfair" even if they fit no pattern previously
condemned by statute or case law.38
A plan's effort to terminate physicians from a desired plan
because they choose not to participate in another plan product is
unfair in every sense of the term. There are multiple victims
harmed by such schemes. Physicians lose access to the vehicle
by which they provide medical care to their patients; patients
lose access to the physician of their choice, thereby disrupting
the physician-patient relationship and the continuous provision of
medical care. In contrast to the harm suffered by the victims,
there is absolutely no beneficial or otherwise procompetitive mo-
tive behind such conduct. Indeed, it appears to be undertaken
purely for the sake of self-interest and retaliation against individ-
uals upon whom many plan enrollees have come to rely and
trust.
35. CA. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996).
36. Motors, Inc. v. Times Mirror Co., 162 Cal. Rptr. 543, 546 (Ct. App. 1980).
37. Id.
38. See Allied Grape Growers v. Bronco Wine Co., 249 Cal. Rptr. 872, 883 (Ct. App.
1988).
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VI. NOTICE TO PATIENTS
Whatever the reason for physician termination, patients
should be notified in advance when their physician will be termi-
nated from the plan. Such notice should give patients plenty of
opportunity to take the following actions: i) to find a new plan
physician; ii) to protest the physician's termination when the pa-
tient disagrees with the decision; and, iii) to find out what other
plans the physician has contracted with so that the patient may
endeavor to join one of those plans. The last condition is dis-
cussed below.
Under California law, when an HMO terminates a contract
with a medical group or IPA, the plan must notify enrollees of
that medical group or IPA of the termination.39 When a plan ter-
minates a contract with an individual physician within a medical
group or IPA, the plan may request that the group or IPA notify
the enrollees who are patients of that physician of the
termination. 40
A. Patients Should Have The Opportunity to Stay with the
Terminated Physician
Physicians should have a role in notifying patients of termi-
nation. A letter may be sent jointly by the plan and the physician
advising patients that they have the right to choose one of the
other plan physicians, or transfer to one of the other (listed)
plans with whom the terminated physician contracts. This gives
both sides equal opportunity to retain the patient as a consumer
and is most beneficial to the patient.
B. Plan Efforts to Thwart Patient Choice of Physician
Managed care plans design various contractual provisions to
prohibit terminated physicians from continuing to see plan pa-
tients through the physician's other plan affiliations. Plans may
designate patient lists as "confidential trade secrets" to attempt
to prohibit physicians from utilizing those lists to contact patients
and inform them that the physician has been terminated. Some
contracts require the physician to transfer medical records or
copies thereof to the plan upon termination.
39. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1373.65(a).
40. Id. § 1373.65(b).
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Many managed care contracts with physicians contain a
covenant-not-to-compete with the plan, effective both during the
contract period and after termination. Covenants-not-to-compete
after contract termination are enforceable in most states, but are
unenforceable in others, under certain circumstances. For exam-
ple, in California, they are unenforceable against physicians who
do not have an ownership interest in the contracting entity.4!
Despite plan efforts to keep patients within the plan, current
law strongly suggests that a physician leaving a plan has the
right to inform patients of the move and give patients the oppor-
tunity to choose whether to remain with the plan or to go with
the physician. In Jones v. Fakehany,42 the court concluded that
an ex-employee physician's patients had the right to continue to
be treated by that physician if they so desired, and, therefore, the
ex-employee was entitled to notify patients of the new location.
In so ruling, the court stated that "[s]ince the practice of
medicine is a profession and not a business, the practices
adopted by businesses are not necessarily suitable." 43 It further
stated that the physician-patient relationship "may not properly
be regarded as the subject of 'ownership' " and that patients' ac-
cess to the care of their physician of choice is not to be circum-
vented by the " 'property rights' of any competing physician." 44
Although the Jones case related to an employer group and em-
ployee physician, its reasoning would apply to the plan-physician
relationship as well.
Moreover, in a Florida case, Humana Medical Plan, Inc. v.
Jacobson,45 the court held that subscribers are not the property of
the HMO. The court held invalid a clause in an HMO contract
that required a physician to pay liquidated damages for seeing
HMO patients at another HMO after the contract terminated.
Managed care contracts also may contain an anti-solicitation
clause, prohibiting physicians from soliciting patients to join
them at another plan or practice. Case law in California suggests
that anti-solicitation agreements may prohibit physicians from
41. CAL Bus. & PRoF. CODE §§ 16600-16601 (West 1987). See also Bosley Medical
Group v. Abramson, 207 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Ct. App. 1984) (concluding that any agreement not
to compete is void under § 16600).
42. 67 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Ct. App. 1968).
43. Id. at 815 (quoting the Opinions and Reports of the Judicial Council of the Ameri-
can Medical Association).
44. Id.
45. 614 So. 2d 520, 522 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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going beyond an appropriate professional announcement and af-
firmatively soliciting the patient's business, that is, "[t]o ask for
with earnestness, to make petition for, to endeavor to obtain, to
awake or excite to action, or to invite" such business.46 It is un-
likely that courts that follow the reasoning in Jones will prohibit
announcements informing patients that they may continue to see
the terminated physician and may authorize the transfer of medi-
cal records to that physician for the reasons described therein.
The line between a lawful "announcement" and an unlawful
"solicitation," however, is not clear.
VII. APPEAL OF TERMINATION DECISION
Some managed care contracts prohibit physicians from ap-
pealing contract terminations. Such provisions generally are un-
fair because the termination may be based on information which
is inaccurate, mistaken, or requires physician explanation. For
example, as discussed above, a minority physician's contract may
be terminated because of a bad U.R. profile, when that physi-
cian's more infirm patient population is not considered. Moreo-
ver, as discussed above, if the contract is terminated for quality
reasons, the physician may be entitled to a hearing under some
state and federal laws.
A. The Delta Dental and Ambrosino Cases
A California case, Delta Dental Plan v. Banasky,47 suggests
that physicians terminated by managed care plans are entitled to
a fair hearing under certain circumstances. The case did not in-
volve a termination, but, rather, an issue about payment levels.
The Delta Dental Plan is a dental HMO in California. The plan's
review committee determined that certain dentists's usual, cus-
tomary, and reasonable (UCR) fees were lower than the dentists
had represented. This determination resulted in lower plan pay-
ments to the dentists. (Plan payments were based on a discount
based on the UCR.) The court ruled, consistent with the Califor-
nia common law right to fair procedure, that the plan was re-
quired to give the dentists a fair procedure in response to their
46. American Credit Indem. Co. v. Sacks, 262 Cal. Rptr. 92, 99 (Ct. App. 1989) (quot-
ing Aetna Bldg. Maintenance Co. v. West, 246 P.2d 11, 15 (1952)).
47. 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 381 (Ct. App. 1994).
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challenge to the decision regarding lower payments. 48 The den-
tists were entitled to fair procedure because the plan's reduction
of the dentists's fees affected their "important economic inter-
ests." 49 The case specifically recognizes termination from a plan
as another circumstance requiring fair procedure. The court
stated: "California courts have long recognized a common law
right to fair procedure protecting individuals from arbitrary ex-
clusion or expulsion from private organizations which control im-
portant economic interests ...."50
The court further stated: "Delta controls an important eco-
nomic interest as the largest dental health plan in California, cov-
ering over 8,000,000 individuals. Therefore, continued member-
ship on Delta's panel of participating dentists and Delta's
modification of a participating dentist's list of usual, customary,
and reasonable fees implicates the right to fair procedure." 51
Similarly, a large HMO, PPO, or IPA that terminates a phy-
sician may control an important economic interest for that physi-
cian, depending upon, inter alia, the number of patients that the
physician has with the plan and the plan's market share in the
physician's practice area. Therefore, a termination from the
plan's panel may implicate the right to fair procedure in Califor-
nia. While the language quoted above regarding termination was
dicta, plan termination is generally more detrimental than a
change in payment, and the courts should extend fair hearing
rights in cases that affect "important economic interests."
The Case of Ambrosino v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Com-
pany, -52 provides further support for the argument that plans must
provide fair hearings. In that case, a podiatrist was terminated
from a plan because of prior drug use. The podiatrist argued that
his membership in the defendant's network was subject to the
right to a fair procedure (hearing) to protect providers from arbi-
trary expulsion. The court agreed, citing the Delta Dental case,
above:
The common law right to fair procedures has recently been
held to extend to health care providers' membership in pro-
vider networks such as that operated by Defendant, because
48. Id. at 385.
49. Id.
50. Id. (quoting Applebaum v. Board of Dir., 163 Cal. Rptr. 831 (Ct. App. 1980)).
51. Id. (emphasis added).
52. 899 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
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such managed care providers [sic] control substantial economic
interests. [Citing, Delta Dental Plan v. Banasky, 27 Cal. App.
4th 1598 (1994)]. In the instant case, it is undisputed that
Defendant controls substantial economic interests affecting
Plaintiff, since prior to Plaintiff's termination approximately
fifteen percent of Plaintiff's patients were insured by
Defendant.53
Accordingly, the court ruled that the plaintiff had a right to
a fair procedure, including the right not to be expelled for rea-
sons which are arbitrary, capricious and/or contrary to public
policy. The court stated that based upon the public policy of en-
couraging drug rehabilitation and prohibiting discrimination for
past dependency, a termination of a contract solely because of a
person's status as a formerly chemical dependent person would
be arbitrary and capricious, and thus deprived plaintiff of his le-
gal right to a fair procedure.
VIII. CONCLUSION
As managed care proliferates, it is clear that for many phy-
sicians, being a member of a certain plan has a huge economic
impact on the physician's ability to practice. The Delta Dental &
Ambrosino cases are likely the beginning of many court deci-
sions that will recognize that termination from a managed care
contract interferes with the physician-patient relationship and
often puts physicians in economic straits. Thus, courts should not
permit plans to terminate physicians without cause.
53. Id. Citing Ascherman v. San Francisco Med. Soc'y, 114 Cal. Rptr. 681 (Ct. App.
1974) (holding that an estimated loss of business of 10% for fist four years and another 10%
thereafter is sufficient economic deprivation to trigger application of doctrine of fair proce-
dures). However, Ascherman precedes later cases which state that there is no need to show
any percentage of business affected for hospital and medical society termination; the termina-
tion in itself shows the loss of an important economic interest.
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